2024-11-17

R 6:21

footnote: cf. antinomies of time in KrV

--> can we say more about the inscrutability by going a layer above?

cf. KpV, on why there's no deduction of practical philosophy, and on fact of reason

first subjective ground/first disposition: part of the spontaneity, but not the spontaneity itself. (Prof. DeWitt)

R 6:24

"any incentive", "incorporation"

whoever makes it his maxim is morally good

(consider the conjunction of all sub-maxims as a single maxim, and incorporation is just adding new conjuncts)

incorporation: making the incentive as the motivation/end (idk which one, maybe end) of a maxim.

R 6:25

to have ... disposition by nature as an innate characteristic ... means rather that it has not been earned in time ...

This disposition too, however, must be adopted through the free power of choice,

there cannot be further cognition of the subjective ground

we call it a characteristic of the power of choice that pertains to it by nature

even though the disposition is in fact grounded in freedom

1. Is it grounded in freedom because the subjective ground is that of the exercise of human being's freedom in general? (R 6:21)

2. If the first disposition (by nature, out of time) of a person is evil, does that mean they'll always be evil??

   1. No. x is good/evil by nature -> x can only be the whole species

R 6:26

1. rationality doesn't imply responsibility, since at least so far we can't see how "x has reason -> x has a faculty determining the power of choice unconditionally"

Footnote:

Yet this law is the only law that makes us conscious of the independence of our power of choice from determination by all other incentives and thereby also of the accountability of all our actions.