2024-11-20

RMPL p58

respect is incorporated into the maxim

how?? by what faculty, into which part of the maxim??

p59

positively promotes

(because p57, the form of the maxim is valued as an object of respect)

KpV 5:80

The consciousness of a free submission of the will to the law [...] is respect for the law.

There needs to be a consciousness, and it must be able to freely submit the will to the law.

c.f. MM 6:251

For an object of my choice is something that I have the physical power to use. If it were nevertheless absolutely not within my rightful power to make use of it, that is, if the use of it could not coexist with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal law (would be wrong), then freedom would be depriving itself of the use of its choice with regard to an object of choice, by putting usable objects beyond any possibility of being used; in other words, it would annihilate them in a practical respect and make them into res nullius, even though in the use of things choice was formally consistent with everyone's outer freedom in accordance with universal laws

I can necessarily see ... as good -- the consciousness must be necessarily connected with the Wille, respect, and Practical Rs. (Taste involved?)

Is it the same consciousness as the apperception? How are they related to the spontaneity of the Wille?

If we take Willkur to be the faculty of desire that takes gratification/empirical pleasure and means/cognition of nature, and outputs maxims -- then Willkur, even without respect/wille, is free in the sense that it provides, through theoretical reason, an objective mapping from the set of tuples of pleasure and means to the set of maxims. -- It seems Willkur can be at the same time determined by nature (because it offers a pure function) and a self-caused cause. Note that we consider the apperception to be self-caused (even though given the same manifold it gives the same unity?).

Similarly, given the same maxim, Wille always outputs the same "verdict" of whether or not it's moral. -- In this sense, Wille is also "determined" -- even though it's self-caused.

How does willkur interact with theoretical reason? Is it just a side of theoretical reason? (Considering what Kant said in the intro of KU -- but then it'd be problematic to call Willkur a lower nature.)

Maxim (the conjunction, should be mentioned somewhere in R about incorporation) vs maxim

When Wille and Willkur evaluate maxims, they are likely evaluating the Maxim instead of just a particular conjunct.