2024-11-27

G 435

infinite worth, dignity, v.s. taste and price

KpV 5:73

Hence we can see a priori that the moral law, as the determining ground of the will, must by thwarting all our inclinations produce a feeling that can be called pain;

Is this how freedom deprives itself (the lower part) of the use of certain means? In this case, such pain would be a lower feeling -- which would be not quite right as the moral law needs to be always available.

Or it could be a "higher" feeling that only acts on the Willkur (where the spontaneity is).

By "will" is it talking about willkur or Willkur?

This can be problematic since there must be a consciousness of a free submission of the will to the moral law. In this picture, willkur is determined, then this pain must be generated freely by the Willkur.

How are these play with RPML?

PS: relationship between choose and choice in KpV -- do they strictly correspond to the lower nature?

Respect:

incorporated into maxim by wille -> does the lower willkur care about it? or is it just about Willkur here? But if it's just about Willkur it's unclear how this incorporation is needed.

the consciousness of a free submission of the will to the moral law

The will here must be Willkur, and free must be in the spontaneous sense (w/ first disposition). Otherwise it'll be practical love instead of respect (since Wille is just pV itself).

Apperception:

There needs to be a self-consciousness "I will" so that all my willings can be called what I have willed. This would be closely related to the Willkur, first disposition, fact of reason (consciousness of the moral law), and RPML (consciousness of free submission). Important question: is this the same (or aspects of the same self-consciousness) as the "I think" in sect. 16 of KrV, or are they different? In the latter case there would be a split self. In the former case it might offer a way to bridge rV and pV (also, need to consider the faculty of judgment).

Also, is there one single "I will" that alone unifies willkur and Wille (in the sense that willkur and Wille are actually wills as ends and are not really desiring on their own, i.e. to say we have willkur and Wille as two wills is really a use of incomplete symbols), or is there some consciousness in each of them on their own???

The "I will" must itself value both gratification/agreeableness and respect/moral correctness, or subordination wouldn't be possible.

How does the first disposition and taste come into play here?